Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Predicates, philosophy, logic: predicates are symbols that can stand in logical formulas for properties. In fact, not every predicate stands for a property, since it has contradictory predicates, but no contradictory properties. For example, one can think of a predicate "squaround" for "square and round", that is, two properties that exclude each other. One can then truthfully say "Nothing is squaround". There are therefore more predicates than properties. See also round square, scheme characters, quantification, 2nd level logic, predication, attributes, adjectives._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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E. Tugendhat on Predicates - Dictionary of Arguments
I 172 Predicate/Tugenhat: VsObject theory: the predicate is not to stand for something - we need a different explanation. I 208 Quasi-predicates/Tugendhat: assuming primitive language, expression of these predicates only in the presence of the object - no theory of use - concurrence of usage and explanation situation. >Terminology/Tugendhat. I 209 Predicates/Tugendhat: real predicate must be situation independent (that is, especially independent from the circumstances) - situation independency by connection to singular term. >Circumstances, >Situations, >Singular terms. I 295 Predicates/Tugendhat: not all are suitable to be reformulated inside the conjunction: E.g. Peter and Paul stand next to each other: that cannot be reformulated to Peter stands next to each other and Paul stands next to each other. I 332 Predicate/Tugendhat: predicates are not about the rule of use ((s) use, meaning), but about the verification rule (s) Truth). >Verification, >Use, >Use theory. I 335 The rule of use is not determined by the particular situation - 1. the manner of use of "F "in the special use "this is F" is already the general manner of use of "F" in any sentences "Fa" 2. with that, the word "true" is already explained: with a truth condition in which the word "applies" no longer exists: if one can use the sentence 'this is F' correctly in the situation, in which one can replace "this" for "a", "correct" according to the presupposed explanation of the verification-rule of "F". I 332 Quasi-predicate/Tugendhat: E.g. in "this is red" "red" could still function as a quasi-predicate - so the essence cannot already lie in the external addition of "this is .. " - but only in the special manner of use (use) of "this"- Predicates: are needed instead of quasi-predicate because we cannot only connect the classification term "F" with other complementary expressions to say something else than "this is F ', but to say the same thing from a different situation. >Terminology/Tugendhat, >Contextuality, >Generality, >Generalization. I 483 Attributes/Tugendhat: predicates refer to attributes - not to objects. >Attributes, >Objects._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
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> Counter arguments against Tugendhat
> Counter arguments in relation to Predicates
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28